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Do job characteristics modulate the relationship between import competition and workers’ 
wages? Using pooled cross-sectional, linked employee-establishment Census Bureau microdata 
and O*NET occupational characteristics, the paper models import competition and wages for 
over 1.6 million individuals, grouped by job vulnerability defined by routineness, analytic 
complexity, and interpersonal interaction. Results show import competition is associated with 
wages that are: lower in routine and less complex jobs; higher in nonroutine and complex jobs; 
and higher for the highest and lowest levels of interpersonal interaction. This demonstrates the 
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 Over the past half century, dramatic improvements in transportation technologies have 
significantly reduced the cost of moving goods (e.g., Levinson, 2006). Advances in 
communication technologies have simultaneously reduced the cost of information exchange. 
These changes fostered a great expansion in trade of goods and services, enabling firms to better 
develop and control value chains distributed across the globe (Bonacich & Wilson, 2008; Coe & 
Yeung, 2015; Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; Kleibert, 2015). The rise in the complexity of 
global production networks, related-party trade, and foreign direct investment flows indicate that 
growing numbers of businesses are exploiting newfound capacities to fragment production 
across developed and developing economies alike. Unlike traditional spatial divisions of labor 
built around finished goods such as those described by Ricardo (1891), or on monopolistic 
competition between varieties of goods as analyzed by Krugman (1979), the contemporary 
reworking of the production and trade landscape involves a much finer-grained division of 
production possibilities that Baldwin (2006), Blinder (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006) tie not to industries but to production tasks.  
 Tasks represent all the incremental steps of the production process necessary to design, 
test, construct, assemble, sell, and deliver intermediate goods and, eventually, final products and 
services. More specifically, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg define tasks as “the finest possible 
addition to the value added of a good or service done by a particular factor of production” (2012, 
p. 595), with the production of intermediate goods comprising “bundles” of tasks. The 
proliferation of trade in such bundles of tasks has relied on the ability to integrate and control 
distributed production networks, involving the efficient and cost-effective coordination of the 
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movement of goods, services, and information across the globe. This is remapping patterns of 
global trade and specialization.  
 This article joins a growing literature exploring how these substantial shifts have 
affected worker welfare. It builds on prior work that discriminates between workers on the basis 
of the tasks they perform. This work argues that relatively routine tasks, meaning those that can 
be readily codified, are increasingly vulnerable to being offshored (Baldwin, 2006; Blinder, 
2006; Leamer and Storper, 2001), or replaced by computers, robots, and related technological 
investments (e.g., Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003). When workers performing these tasks are 
not displaced by foreign competition or automation, they likely experience downward pressure 
on their wages, driven by import competition from low wage countries. In contrast, tasks that 
involve complex judgment-based decisions, and those requiring interpersonal interaction, are 
more costly to offshore and automate. For firms with workers specialized in these less routine 
tasks, globalization may actually increase demand and wages. We theorize that while trade today 
is more complicated than ‘wine for cloth,’ shifts in comparative advantage are simply more fine-
grained, hewing closer to tasks than final goods. The distributional consequences of these 
patterns of trade should be visible in the relative wages earned by workers engaged in different 
kinds of tasks.  
 This paper explores whether the job characteristics of US workers influence how 
import competition from low-wage countries shapes their wages. We expect that workers will be 
more vulnerable to low-wage country import competition if the tasks they perform are (a) highly 
routine, (b) require little analytic complexity, and (c) involve scant interpersonal interaction. To 
test these hypotheses, we build standard measures of low-wage import competition using annual 
US Trade data, and relate these to individual and establishment characteristics derived from US 
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Census Bureau data. We estimate pooled cross-sectional models predicting   annual wages for 
1.6 million workers across the years 1990, 2000 and 2007. Each worker’s occupation is the basis 
for their task profile, built from the US Department of Labor’s O*NET database. The resulting 
dataset allows us to model the effect of low-wage import competition on the wages of workers 
with different occupational characteristics, net of the effects of education, demographics, and 
establishment characteristics.  
 In relation to important recent work in the same area, we add value in a few ways. We 
add to the findings of Autor et al. (2013a; 2014; 2016) by linking the impacts of rising import 
competition on worker wages to the task character of different occupations, responding to their 
call for “recharacterizing the sets of individuals who are likely candidates for opposing 
distributional consequences from economic integration” (Autor et al., 2016, p. 234). We expand 
on the insights of Ebenstein et al. (2013) that note the importance of thinking less about industry 
and more about occupations when trying to unpack the impacts of globalization, by observing 
multiple trade-vulnerable task characteristics. Cumulatively, this builds the understanding of 
these dynamics in the US context. In doing so, we are also in conversation with similar work in 
Germany (Baumgarten et al., 2013) and Denmark (Hummels et al., 2014); this contributes to the 
growing evidence of the importance of occupational tasks in modulating the impacts of import 
competition across advanced economies.  
 To preview the findings, we show that task characteristics mediate the wage effects of 
low-wage import competition. Import competition from low-wage countries is associated with 
lower wages for workers with highly routine manual jobs and workers with jobs that have low 
analytic complexity. At the same time, workers in jobs with less routine manual tasks and greater 
analytic complexity earn higher wages when low-wage import competition rises. The influence 
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of interpersonal task intensity on the trade-wage relationship is less straightforward to unpack. 
Workers in occupations with high levels of interpersonal interaction have higher wages when 
there is greater import competition from low-wage countries. Interestingly, the same is true for 
workers with the lowest levels of interpersonal interaction in their jobs. Only workers with 
medium-low levels of interpersonal interaction in their occupations suffer lower wages with 
increased low-wage import competition. Interaction effects show that the mediating relationship 
of task intensity is non-linear. These results demonstrate the importance of accounting for 
occupational characteristics to more fully understand the relationship between trade and wages 
and suggest underappreciated aspects of trade’s distributional effects within countries.  
 The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature on trade, tasks, and labor market effects. Section 3 outlines an empirical model to 
capture the importance of task characteristics in describing the relationship between trade and 
wages.  Data sources, variable construction, and a series of empirical concerns are discussed. 
Section 4 presents the results from estimating a series of related statistical models. Section 5 
concludes, summarizing the key findings.  
 
2: Trade, tasks, and labor market effects: A brief review of key literature  
 Researchers argue that global economic integration shapes the geography of trade, 
production, and labor market dynamics at multiple spatial scales (Autor et al., 2013b; Bernard et 
al., 2006; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). Significant attention has been directed at north-south 
linkages captured through increased levels of low-wage country (LWC) import competition 
within older industrialized economies (Bernard et al., 2006), often with a focus on the rapid 
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growth of China and its growing importance in global manufacturing activity (Autor et al., 
2016).  
 The surge in LWC imports from China and elsewhere is driven not only by arms-length 
trade, but by offshoring, the movement of jobs previously located in one country to other parts of 
the world (Blinder and Krueger, 2013). Jobs that are offshored may remain within the same 
company or they may be outsourced, moving from one firm to another. More and more trade 
takes place within global production networks that tie firms and countries to one another through 
complex webs of trade in intermediate goods and services (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; Coe 
et al., 2004). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimates that 80% of 
all global trade in 2013 was undertaken by transnational corporations moving inputs and outputs 
along their global value chains (UNCTAD, 2013). Estimates by the US Department of 
Commerce suggest that approximately two-thirds of United States’ imports and exports comprise 
“related-party” trade (Barefoot, 2012). 
 These shifts require renewed attention to the changing geography and structure of 
international trade, and substantial retheorization, especially in regards to trade’s welfare impacts 
(see Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006, 2008; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2014). It is 
already clear that it makes little sense to explore the influence of trade across industries, as 
segments of industrial sectors are broken apart and moved between countries. At least for a 
while, we tended to think of education and skills as the key determinants of trade-based job 
vulnerability (Frobel et al., 1980; Feenstra and Hanson, 2001). However, Baldwin (2006) and 
Blinder (2006) make clear that the “second great unbundling” of work today is based upon a 
separation of job tasks that is only weakly correlated with workforce skill and levels of schooling 
(Jensen and Kletzer, 2010; Blinder and Krueger, 2013).  The fine-grained level of competition 
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that this new trade permits makes clear that its effects will be differentially located not only 
within industries but also within firms and across groups of workers previously thought to share 
the same fate (Baldwin & Robert-Nicoud, 2006). This reality complicates modeling efforts as 
well as policy responses, prompting reconsideration of workforce and job characteristics that 
shape the contours of trade impacts. 
Theoretical models  
 Beyond the models commonly used to understand impacts of trade on workers and 
firms (e.g., Bernard et al., 2006; Ethier, 2005; Feenstra & Hanson, 1996, 2001), there are a 
number of explicit models of trade in tasks that are particularly helpful in examining the 
potential effects of trade on workers with different task profiles.i The present research draws 
most heavily upon Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), who argue that what is traded, or 
offshored, is determined by weighing the costs of monitoring and controlling workers in another 
country against the potential savings from lower labor costs.  It is assumed that the costs of 
coordinating workers from a distance are lower for more routine tasks than for nonroutine tasks, 
that routine tasks are more likely to be performed by low-wage workers and nonroutine tasks by 
high-wage workers (e.g., Autor et al., 2003). Reductions in trade costs, particularly 
communications costs, lead to increased offshoring of trade-vulnerable tasks.  
 The Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg (2008) framework suggests that offshoring reduces 
costs and affects wages in the high-wage (onshore) country in three ways: through terms of trade 
effects (reducing the price of the imported goods since they are likely made by workers with 
lower wages); labor supply effects (with demand decreasing for workers with the task trade 
vulnerable characteristics), and; productivity effects (where the onshore workers refocus on 
higher-productivity tasks). The aggregate effect of these three wage effects is not clear from the 
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model itself. The second effect suggests that average wages for workers in the home country will 
fall, but the first and third effects suggest that average wages could rise. Note that Rojas-
Romagoas (2010) runs numerical simulations of the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg model and 
finds that with nearly all combinations of endowments, robust to a wide a range of parameters, 
the model leads to increased inequality in the onshore, high-wage country.  
 However, beyond aggregate effects, this model highlights how the effects of trade and 
offshoring will impact workers differentially. Even if trade-vulnerable workers benefit from 
terms of trade and general productivity effects, demand for their labor falls. This can translate 
directly into job loss (Kemeny et al., 2015), but it may also erode their bargaining power, and 
inhibit wage growth. Thus, as trade with low-wage countries increases, wage patterns should 
track differential task profiles among workers.  
Which tasks will be vulnerable to import competition?   
 While the basic routine-nonroutine continuum underlies the Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) model, an evolving body of work seeks to identify which tasks are most 
vulnerable to offshoring (e.g., Jensen and Kletzer, 2010; Blinder and Krueger, 2013). Building 
from extant theoretical and empirical contributions we focus here on three key characteristics: 
manual routineness, analytical complexity, and interpersonal interaction. 
 Autor et al. (2003) define routine tasks as those requiring “a limited and well-defined 
set of cognitive and manual activities, those that can be accomplished by following explicit 
rules” (p. 1280). In decline in high-wage economies like the US, the UK and Germany (Autor et 
al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Spiz-Oener, 2006), routine tasks are susceptible to 
investments in labor-replacing technology as well as (as formalized by Grossman & Rossi-
9 
Hansberg, 2006 and Baldwin & Robert-Nicoud, 2014) offshoring within global production 
networks (Oldenski, 2012).ii  
 For Leamer and Storper (2001), while routineness allows tasks to be performed far 
from the firm’s headquarters or management, it is not the characteristics of individual tasks that 
matter, but rather the coordination between them. Newly fractured production processes may 
technically be performed in any number of places, but at sufficiently high levels of coordination 
costs, it will be more efficient to keep fragments co-located.  Blinder (2006) identifies a related 
distinction between services in which personal contact is key and those “that can be delivered 
electronically over long distances with little or no degradation in quality” (p. 114).  
While coordination costs and distance-sensitivity are not easily observed directly, one might 
discern both by measuring task requirements for interpersonal interaction (Becker et al, 2013; 
Baumgarten et al., 2013).  
Closely related empirical work 
 There has been a recent proliferation of empirical research on the impacts of trade amid 
the ongoing global remapping of production networks. This work has largely focused on the 
impacts of trade on labor markets and in some cases worker compensation.   
 In a series of important papers, Autor et al. (2013a, 2014, 2016) explore the influence 
of China’s rapid growth and global economic engagement on workers across the United States. 
Using labor market variation in low-wage country import exposure (driven largely by imports 
from China) and assumed low levels of worker geographical mobility, they show that the local 
labor market effects of import competition drive increases in unemployment, reduce levels of 
labor force participation, and increase reliance on transfer payments (Autor et al., 2013a).  
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 Beyond area effects, individual workers are also directly affected. Autor et al. (2014) 
show that workers in sectors experiencing the largest import shocks face significantly lower 
cumulative earnings, fewer hours of work and more sectoral job volatility. These impacts are 
greater for low-wage workers, those who face the most direct competition from low-wage 
country imports. While this research controls for demographic characteristics of workers it does 
not examine the heterogeneity of trade impacts by education, skill, or most importantly, task 
status.  
 The importance of occupation on the relative fortunes of workers is demonstrated by 
Ebenstein et al. (2013), who show that occupational exposure to trade and offshoring has a larger 
impact than industrial exposure. Their measure of occupation exposure, along a continuum of 
routine to nonroutine tasks, links to other import task-oriented studies. For example, Oldenski 
(2012) focuses on the decisions by MNCs to move tasks offshore to foreign affiliates or to 
outsource them domestically. She finds US MNCs were more likely to offshore routine tasks to 
foreign affiliates and more likely to keep complex and nonroutine tasks in the US. Kemeny and 
Rigby (2012) develop a similar approach to Oldenski, but they ask a broader question exploring 
the effects of all trade from low-wage countries (and not just related party MNC trade) on the 
demand for occupations with different task characteristics. They find that import competition 
from low-wage countries increases sector-specific demand for nonroutine tasks, both in the form 
of interpersonal interaction and nonroutine analytical tasks, and lowers demand for routine tasks. 
Ottaviano et al. (2013) relate shifts in MNC offshoring activities to the reallocation of 
employment, considering domestic effects on both natives and immigrants. They find evidence 
of a link between offshoring and greater demand for natives performing communication-
intensive tasks. 
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 Related work on industrialized countries outside the United States reveals similar 
patterns (e.g., Becker et al., 2013; Mion & Zhu, 2013; see Autor et al., 2016 for more). Of 
particular relevance for the research presented in this article, Baumgarten et al. (2013) examine 
the offshoring impacts on individual male workers’ wages in Germany. They find substantial 
negative wage effects from offshoring, particularly when, conceptually similar to Ebenstein et al. 
(2013), they allow for cross-industry offshoring effects, essentially assuming that workers can 
find work in their chosen occupation in a number of industries. Their analysis shows that that 
highly non-routine or interactive occupations, built from the tools used in occupations (Becker et 
al., 2013), mitigate the negative wage effects of offshoring. Using Danish matched employer-
employee data, Hummels et al. (2014) find that routine occupations (within skill groups 
determined by education level) are associated with wage losses from offshoring by their own 
firm. Interestingly, beyond the more commonly used routine or interactive task divisions, they 
also examine area of study associated with occupations. Here they find that math skills key 
within non-routine occupations, which are protective against pressures from offshoring, and 
other areas such as the social sciences also support wage premia. In both Baumgarten et al. 
(2013) and Hummels et al. (2014), the rich longitudinal micro data support a strong analytical 
approach and compelling findings.  
 This paper makes several contributions to enrich this area of study. First, closely 
complementing Baumgarten et al. (2013) and Hummels et al. (2014), this study provides 
evidence of the task-inflected wage impacts of international competition, but for the United 
States. Since our data are structured somewhat differently than theirs, the rich set of individual 
and industry-location variables we include explicitly measure some of what is absorbed by their 
fixed effects, providing additional information. Examining these relationships across different 
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national contexts lends support to these findings as likely to be more broadly generalizable 
across advanced economies. This is also strengthened by the relatively long timeframe in this 
paper, which may better capture a longer-run process of trade induced labor market impacts. 
Second, specific to prior studies based on US data, this study complements and expands the 
knowledge in several ways. It expands on the research showing certain tasks are more likely to 
be offshored (Oldenski, 2012; Kemeny and Rigby, 2012; Ottaviano et al., 2013) to observes the 
wage effects of these pressures on jobs remaining onshore. And in observing wage patterns 
(Autor et al., 2013a, 2014; Ebenstein et al., 2013), our use of matched employer-employee data 
attend to task characteristics and provide additional important controls on plant level 
characteristics. Thus, we gain more purchase on whether the tasks performed by US workers 
exert a significant effect on individual level wage adjustments prompted by import competition 
after worker and establishment characteristics are accounted for.  
 
3: Empirical strategy  
Our analysis rests on a wage model that relates the wages of individual manufacturing 
workers to low-wage import competition, and includes a set of standard control variables. To 
estimate how task characteristics shape the influence of import competition on wages, we 
estimate the wages of workers grouped by their occupational task characteristics. Before 
describing the wage model, we describe the data used.  
 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Matched employer-employee data  
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In the U.S., there is a jobs frame matched employee-employer dataset based on 
administrative data (see McKinney and Vilhuber, 2011). However at the time of this research, 
these data lacked workers’ occupation codes, essential to the current study. Thus, the analytical 
sample in this study is derived from a matched employer-employee database that we built using 
confidential versions of the US Census Bureau’s Decennial Census (1990 and 2000), American 
Community Survey (ACS 3-year 2005-2007 file), and Census of Manufactures (CMF 1992, 
2002, 2007 files). Using variables for place of work and industry of work for individuals 
employed in the manufacturing sector in the Decennial and ACS, we made a probabilistic match 
to establishments in the CMF based on industry codes and detailed plant location. The locations 
used in the matching process start with census tracts; to maintain consistent areal boundaries 
across all years of the data, some census tracts are grouped together creating slightly larger 
geographical units. We differentiate between approximately 70 industry classes and 
approximately 60,000 census tracts and tract-groups to build our linked employer-employee data. 
Where there is only a single establishment in an industry-location cell, workers with that 
same industry-location combination can be unambiguously matched to that establishment. These 
uniquely matched individuals slightly over-represent men and uniquely matched plants are larger 
than average, but less likely to be in urban areas. When there is more than one establishment in 
an industry-location cell, a unique match between plant and worker is impossible. In these cases, 
we link the workers in that industry-location to a synthetic establishment, which has the average 
of the characteristics of the individual plants in that industry and location. The main tradeoff 
involved in this averaging is between some loss of establishment heterogeneity and keeping a 
larger set of manufacturing workers, notably many of those who work in urban areas and dense 
manufacturing areas.  
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This matching process, which links workers from the Decennial and ACS to plants 
observed in the CMF, results in over a million and a half workers across all our cross sections. 
The set of matched workers appears to be broadly similar to the entire manufacturing workforce 
(see top of Table 1). However, the sample of matched plants clearly includes plants with much 
larger output, which is related to greater exports (also visible in this comparison see the bottom 
of Table 1). While this may limit the applicability of our sample to the smallest manufacturers, 
the large number of workers employed by larger establishments (see Appendix Figure A1) 
suggest that our sample still has importance for understanding the wage dynamics for a large 
segment of the manufacturing workforce.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The characteristics of individual workers and manufacturing plants included in the 
Decennial, ACS, and CMF provide the main dependent variable used – wage and salary earnings 
– as well as a set of key control variables. For individual workers, these include age, sex, 
nativity, race-ethnicity, and education level. For plants, these include establishment output 
(measured as total value of shipments), capital-labor ratio, the value of exports, and computer 
share of investment. The Decennial and ACS data also provide the inputs to calculate the percent 
of immigrant workers with less than a high school diploma in the labor market of each industry 
and state.  
3.1.2. Constructing measures of import competition and task characteristics 
 Similar to Bernard et al. (2006), we measure low-wage country import competition using 
the ratio of low-wage imports within industry i in year t to the value of output in industry i and 





  (1) 
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where #&'%=>?()@AB  is the industry- and year-specific value of imports to the US originating in 
low-wage countries and #&'%=>?() is the value of imports from all countries; ?C#'&DE>?() is 
the total US domestic production (shipments) and DF'%=>?() represents US exports. Yearly 
information on imports and exports are derived from the individual level transactions compiled 
by the Foreign Trade Division of the US Census Bureau. Shipments are from the CMF, 
aggregated from the establishment level to industry-year measures.iii Low-wage countries are 
defined by the World Bank country classification. We use countries classified in the low-income 
group for 1992 throughout our analysis. These countries had Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita less than or equal to US$545 in 1992.iv This set of 51 countries (notably including China) 
remains consistent in our LWICOMP calculations, even though some countries move out of the 
World Bank low income class by 2007.v Once constructed, LWICOMP measures are linked to 
the analytical sample based on the reported industry of each worker, as recorded in the Decennial 
or ACS data.  
The other key variables characterize the occupational tasks or job attributes of each 
worker, based on definitions from O*NET (Occupational Information Network). O*NET is a 
publicly available dataset supported by the US Department of Labor that identifies different 
characteristics of occupations, based on surveys of workers in each occupation.vi Within O*NET, 
‘work activities’ correspond most closely to the conceptions of tasks developed in the theoretical 
literature and follow previous empirical work by Oldenski (2012) using O*NET.vii To generate 
measures of task-intensity for each occupation, we use principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation to reduce several work activities down to individual task measures. The input 
variables and the constructed primary components are summarized in Table 2. We create a single 
measure of routine manual labor using the first principal component derived from the job 
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categories performing general physical activities, handling and moving objects, and controlling 
machines and processes (“routine manual”). We depart from Oldenski’s nonroutineness measure 
that incorporates both creativity and communication, opting instead for two separate measures. 
The first captures analytical and decision making tasks (“complex analytic”) built from a 
combination of analyzing, decision making and problem solving, creative thinking, and 
objectives and strategies development. The second is a measure of interpersonal interaction 
intensity (“complex interpersonal”), based on communications, relationship management, 
conflict resolution, and consulting and advising others. As Table 2 indicates, for each task type, 
we retain only the first principal component that explains at least 70 percent of the underlying 
variation in all cases.  
[Table 2 about here] 
To help ground this discussion, Table 3 shows the task intensities for several occupations. 
In Panel A, below each task intensity measure (routine manual, complex analytic, and complex 
interpersonal) are the component dimensions. The component dimensions are scaled from 0 to 1. 
The task intensity measures are transformed so that the entire range is always a positive number. 
Note that the scales for each task intensity measure are not directly comparable. Panel B shows 
the range of variation in the values in terms of standard deviations, with the industrial production 
manager as the reference category (Column 1). The other occupations involve far more routine 
manual tasks – ranging from just over a half a standard deviation below the industrial production 
manager on the routine scale (sewing machine operators – Column 5) to over one and a half 
standard deviations above the production manager occupation (cutting, punching, pressing 
machine operators – Column 4). Industrial production managers have higher levels of complex 
analytical and interpersonal task measures than the other occupations. Here, the levels of these 
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tasks are two to three standard deviations lower among these occupations compared to the 
production manager. This table shows not only the substantial variation in these measures across 
particular occupations, but also reveals reassuringly intuitive comparisons across the 
occupations. Once constructed, we linked the three occupation-specific task intensity scores to 
individual workers in the analytical sample based on each person’s occupation as reported in the 
Decennial and ACS. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The resulting dataset is a pooled cross-section (1990, 2000, and 2007) that includes over 
1.6 million unique individuals. For the entire analytical sample, Table 4 shows the means, 
standard deviations, and the correlations among the wages, low-wage import competition, task 
intensity measures, and other variables. The measure of routine manual tasks is negatively 
correlated with both complex analytic and interpersonal task intensity. It is also negatively 
correlated with wages, whereas complex analytic and interpersonal task measures are positively 
correlated with wages.  
[Table 4 about here] 
3.2 Estimation 
The aim of the analysis is to explore how different job or task characteristics mediate the 
relationship between low-wage country import competition and the wages of US manufacturing 
workers. We estimate a series of regression models for this purpose. The dependent variable in 
these models is annual wages (year dummies control for inflation) and observations correspond 
to individual workers over the years examined. Workers are placed into quartiles according to 
their occupation along an index of intensity for a given task type – routine manual, complex 
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analytic and complex interpersonal. Equation (2) outlines the base specification that is run 
separately across our three task types 
 
  
 "G(H) = I +	LMN OMG(H) +	LPN QPR(H) + ST&(H) + SU!"#$%&'() +										 
V) + V( + VH + WG(H)                                        (2) 
	 
where "G(H)	is the wage of worker j in industry i, state s at time t ; OG(H) is a u-element vector of 
worker characteristics for worker j , including age, sex, nativity,  race-ethnicity, and education 
level;	QR(H) denotes a v-element vector of features of establishment k, including establishment 
output (total value of shipments), capital-labor ratio, the value of exports, and an establishment-
specific measure of the computer share of investment that proxies for skill-biased technological 
change; &(H)  measures the prevalence of low-education immigrant workers with less than a high 
school diploma in the industry and state of the worker; !"#$%&'() is the measure of import 
competition from low-wage countries, specific to each industry and year. This specification also 
includes three fixed effects terms: V) is a year dummy that accounts for business cycle dynamics 
and other time-specific shocks; V( is an industry fixed effect that captures sector-specific wage 
shocks; VH absorbs state-specific shocks. Finally, W is an error term that is assumed to satisfy 
classical regression assumptions.  
We estimate these equations as pooled cross-sections using ordinary least squares with 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. We recognize the potential for unobserved 
heterogeneity in this specification, which in related contexts the authors have addressed using 
panel data and fixed effects approaches (i.e. Rigby et al., 2017). However, the present data offers 
much richer and more comprehensive information about both workers and establishments than 
can be found in longitudinal matched employer-employee data for the US. While we may not be 
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able to measure all possible sources of heterogeneity in our data, we are able to capture a wide 
range of relevant control variables, which should raise confidence that we can produce efficient 
estimates of the relationship of interest. 
An additional source of potential bias in our specification may result from the correlation 
of low-wage import competition and sector-specific demand or productivity changes in the US 
not captured elsewhere in the model. To account for this potential endogeneity bias, we follow 
Autor et al. (2013a) and instrument for low-wage import competition using a measure of year- 
and industry-specific imports into the EU-15 European nations from the same low-wage 
countries used in our measure of US-based import competition. This instrument is constructed 
from United Nations COMTRADE data. The logic of this instrument assumes that European 
countries face similar exposure to low-wage import competition when imports reflect factors 
inherent in low-wage countries, or in the dynamic of trade between low-wage and high-wage 
countries, but that other factors influencing domestic wages should be relatively uncorrelated 
between the United States and the EU. In specifications employing two stage least squares, this 
instrument should help to identify the independent effect of low-wage import competition on US 
manufacturing wages. 
Finally, rather than estimating quantile regressions over the full range of workers, we opt 
for estimates for particular subsets of workers grouped by task intensity, since the former proved 
too computationally intensive, even given the considerable computing resources in the Federal 
Statistical Research Data Centers. To compare coefficients across task subsamples we calculate 
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where s is the standard error for a given estimated coefficient SZ  and ab indicates the specific 
regression models being compared. The null hypothesis tested is that there are no differences 
between the coefficients in the pair of models, against an alternative that one coefficient is larger 
than another, indicating a one-tailed test. We tested each pair of import competition coefficients 
within each table – for example, low versus high routineness – and for each pair we reject the 
null hypothesis: the differences between the task-quartile subsamples are statistically different 
from each other.  
 
4: Results  
 Based on equation (2), we estimate worker wages using OLS and two-stage least-squares 
for individuals in occupations characterized by low, medium-low, medium-high, and high task 
intensity measures. We are most interested in highlighting the contrasting extremes of the task 
intensities, which should give the clearest signal on the role of tasks in shaping the relationship 
between import competition and wages. Furthermore, because quartiles are somewhat arbitrary 
cut points and we have no clear guidance on where exactly the theorized boundaries should be 
along the task intensity index, the main results we present are from the highest and lowest 
quartiles of each measure. Results for all quartiles are available in the appendix. Every model 
includes state, industry, and year fixed effects. The exact sample sizes and coefficients are 
rounded simply as a precaution to protect the confidentiality of data respondents. The first results 
reported are for workers grouped by the level of routine manual tasks in their occupations. 
 Table 5 reports estimates of the relationship between low-wage import competition and 
wages for workers grouped by the level of routine manual tasks in their occupations. The first 
column reports the results for workers who are engaged in highly routine manual tasks; their 
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occupations score high on moving and handling objects, general physical activities, and 
controlling machines. For these workers, increases in low-wage country import competition 
lowers wages, fitting with expectations. A one unit increase in import competition, a very large 
gain (see Table 4), is associated with an decrease in routine manual wages of roughly $9,000, a 
bit larger than the gender pay gap for these workers.  
 The control variables (in this model, and subsequent ones) operate much as expected. 
Being older, white and non-Hispanic, having higher levels of formal education, and working in a 
metro area are all associated with higher wages. In this column, bring born in the US is also 
associated with higher wages. In states and industries with higher concentrations of foreign born 
workers with low educational attainment, wages are lower. Working in larger plants, with higher 
capital to labor ratios and more exports pays more; but where investments in computers are 
higher, wages are lower.  
[Table 5 about here] 
For workers in occupations involving little routine manual tasks (Column 2), low-wage 
import competition exerts a significant, positive influence on wages. A one unit increase in low-
wage import competition increases wages by an average of close to $29,000, again slightly larger 
than the gender pay gap for these group of workers. The control variables operate largely, though 
not completely, as expected. Here, it is surprising that being born in the US is associated with 
lower earnings. Though neither is statistically significant, the computer share of investment and 
the value of export shipments are both negatively related to wages for this group of workers.  
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 presents results estimated using two-stage least-squares fixed 
effects estimators, using EU imports as an instrument for LWICOMP. In all models the first 
stage diagnostics reported at the bottom of the table indicate the suitability of the instrument. The 
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Kleibergen-Paap K-P rk LM Chi-squared/p-value statistics indicate that the instrumented model 
passes this underidentification test. The Kleibergen-Paap (K-P) F-statistic reports on the 
instrument relevance, here with a value well above the critical Stock-Yogo threshold. We 
conclude that the instrument is relevant and not weak.  
The results in these columns are broadly similar to the OLS estimations in that the 
direction of the relationships stays the same. However, the coefficient for import competition for 
the most routine jobs (Column 3) is no longer statistically significant, and the same coefficient is 
roughly double the magnitude for low routine jobs (Column 4).  
It is difficult to assess which set of regression coefficients provides the best estimates of 
the influence of import competition between the two sets of models in Table 5. The OLS results 
might be compromised with endogeneity issues. However, use of instrumental variables also 
generates biased coefficients. In addition, the relatively large standard errors in the 2SLS models 
– they are roughly double the size of the LWICOMP standard errors in the OLS models – also 
suggests loss of precision in estimation. Note that the inflation of coefficients and their standard 
errors for measures of import competition is commonly observed in the literature (Bernard et al., 
2006). We emphasize, however, the consistent contrast between the two sets of workers, those 
doing nonroutine versus highly routine tasks in their occupations.  
 Table 6 presents results for workers grouped by the intensity with which their jobs 
involve complex analytic tasks. Recall that this task characteristic includes elements of creative 
thinking, analysis, problem-solving, decision-making, and developing objectives and strategies. 
The results shown include those for workers with the least engagement in complex analytic tasks 
(Columns 1 and 3) and the highest intensity of complex analytic tasks (Columns 2 and 4). 
Throughout, the covariates operate in much as we might expect. 
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[Table 6 about here] 
 In Table 6, Column 1, which reports the OLS estimates for workers with the lowest-
complex analytic jobs, low-wage import competition is negatively and significantly associated 
with wages. A one percentage point increase in low-wage country import competition reduces 
the annual wage of workers in the lowest quartile of complex analytic jobs by approximately 
$12,715. As the complex analytic tasks required in occupations increases beyond this lowest 
quartile, the relationship with import competition is reversed. This suggests that analytic 
complexity insulates workers from import competition and that such insulation rises rapidly in 
occupations that demand levels of complexity and analytical skills greater than those found in the 
lowest quartile.  Column 2 shows that for workers with the greatest intensity of complex analytic 
tasks in their jobs, those in the top quartile of complex analytic tasks, the relationship between 
low-wage import competition and wages is positive and significant. We interpret this to be a 
reflection of the reorientation of US comparative advantage, with fine-grained intra-industry 
adjustment towards high-skill kinds of manufactures resulting in rising wages for workers 
performing in-demand tasks.   
 In the two-stage least-squares models shown in Table 6, Columns 3 and 4, the results 
are consistent with the OLS results. The first-stage test statistics lead us to conclude that the 
model is not underidentified and that the instrument is not weak. The notable difference between 
the two sets of results is that the coefficient on LWICOMP for the 2SLS models are roughly 
double what they are in the OLS results. The standard errors for LWICOMP in the 2SLS models 
are also roughly double what they are in the OLS models.  
Table 7 presents results for workers grouped based on the extent to which their jobs 
involve complex interpersonal tasks. Column 1 reports results for workers with low complex 
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interpersonal task intensity in their occupations. Contrary to expectations, low-wage import 
competition has a positive and significant association with wages for this group. For these 
workers, the low levels of interpersonal interaction (communicating with people outside the 
organization, establishing and maintaining personal relationships, resolving conflicts, and 
providing consultations and advice) would seem to fit with the idea that imports from low-wage 
countries should be competitive rather than complementary, but this is not what the results show. 
For the other groups of workers, however, the results support the idea that interpersonal 
interaction intensive jobs should be less vulnerable to offshoring, and therefore also more likely 
to benefit from low-wage imports. In Column 2, the medium-low intensity group displays a 
negative and significant relationship between LWICOMP and wages. In Column 3, the group 
with highest intensity of complex interpersonal tasks in their occupations, low-wage import 
competition is positively and significantly related to wages. The other covariates operate as 
expected.  
[Table 7 about here] 
The instrumented 2SLS results (Table 7, Column 3 and 4) have the same pattern as the 
OLS results, and again the first-stage test statistics lead us to conclude that the model is not 
underidentified and the instrument is not weak. As in previous tables, the 2SLS results have 
much larger coefficients on low-wage import competition than the OLS results.  
The unexpected sign on the LWICOMP coefficient for the workers with the least 
interpersonal interaction is not easy to explain. It is possible that the variables used to construct 
the measure of interpersonal interaction are missing a crucial aspect of vulnerability to 
offshoring; they give a good sense of the necessity of face-to-face communication, but they do 
not capture the necessity of physical presence that might not require communication. Janitors 
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might be a good example. They do not necessarily need to talk much to do their jobs effectively 
and so would score low on the interpersonal interaction measure, but they also cannot email or 
ship their work in from another country. So it is possible that this constructed measure of 
interpersonal interaction is not capturing everything intended. Alternatively, it is possible the 
findings are valid as is. They are consistent with some of the literature looking at the polarization 
in the workforce in countries like the US and UK, where employment and wages are gaining at 
the very top and very bottom of the wage spectrum, but ‘hollowing out’ in the middle (e.g., Goos 
& Manning, 2007).  
Interacting LWC import competition and task characteristics  
 In addition, we estimated equation on all the workers pooled together and included a 
variable interacting LWICOMP and each task intensity measure separately (results not shown 
here for brevity, available upon request). The results reveal that the effect of LWICOMP is 
statistically significantly greater as task intensity increases. Thus, net of the effect of LWICOMP 
and routineness by themselves, LWICOMP has a larger negative effect on wages as routineness 
increases. Complexity and interpersonal interaction show the same pattern, but with the sign 
reversed to reflect their positive association with wages. The interacted term shows that as the 
complexity or level of interpersonal interaction increase, the positive effect on wages from 
LWICOMP also increases.  
 
5: Conclusion 
 An important feature of the changes in international trade over the past few decades is 
increasing fragmentation of production processes across countries linked by trade. One of the 
key implications of this fine-grained fragmentation is that it changes what can conceivably be 
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‘unbundled’ and produced elsewhere. This specialization of production in different countries 
linked by trade is now occurring at the level of tasks and no longer at the level of sectors. 
Education and production/ nonproduction status among workers tells us less about how workers 
are affected by trade and are no longer the only way to conceptualize and measure vulnerability 
to trade competition. It is helpful to think about other ways the effects of trade might be ‘visible.’  
 Responding to these issues, this paper examines the effects of trade on workers based 
on the intensity of key task characteristics in occupations. We explore how occupation-specific 
variation in several task characteristics mediates the relationship between low-wage import 
competition and wages of US manufacturing workers. While our sample over-represents workers 
employed in large plants with more output and exports than average, this is representative of a 
large proportion of the manufacturing labor force. It is important to note though that our results 
may not be as applicable to workers in small plants. That said, controlling for a variety of 
establishment and person characteristics, including educational attainment, we find that low-
wage import competition is associated with lower wages for workers with highly routine manual 
jobs and workers with low complex analytic intensity jobs. Additionally, workers in jobs with 
low routine manual tasks and high complex analytic tasks earn higher wages when there is 
greater import competition. Looking at interpersonal interaction, this paper provides a slightly 
less straightforward finding. Workers with the lowest and highest levels of complex 
interpersonal tasks in their occupations receive higher wages in the face of higher import 
competition, but workers with medium-low intensity of this characteristic have lower wages with 
greater import competition. Interactions show that the magnitude of the effect is not linear, but 
grows as the task intensity grows.  
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 In general, these results suggest that workers who perform tasks that are theoretically 
more vulnerable to offshoring and task trade face negative wage effects associated with low-
wage import competition. The map of global trade continues to shift as the imperatives of 
capitalism respond to changes in transportation, communication, and production technologies. 
As it does, workers face new challenges and opportunities. This study shows that in the US, as in 
several European nations (Baumgarten et al., 2013; Hummels et al., 2014), in response to 
increasing competition from low-wage country imports, these challenges and opportunities 
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Figures and Tables:  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for pooled cross-section of full time, full year workers and 
manufacturing plants, comparing the matched analytical sample to the broader sample of 





Analytical sample of 
matched workers 
Average Annual Nominal Wages 31, 872 40,797 
Average Education Category 1.8 (HS/Some college) 1.7 (HS/Some college) 
Average Age 40 41 
Percent Male 63% 72% 
Percent US Born 91% 88% 
Percent White, Non-Hispanic 83% 83% 
Percent Working in a Metro Area 76% 81% 
Ave. % Foreign Born < GED (year-state-
ind) 
3.69% 5.36% 




Analytical sample of 
matched plants 
Total Value of Shipments 20,061 254,679 
Capital-Labor Ratio 91 107 
Value of Export Shipments 1,689 30,285 
Computer Share of Investments 0.07 0.09 
Authors’ calculations from the FSRDC versions of 1) the Decennial Census Long Form Sample in 1990, and 2000, 
2) the American Community Survey 2005-2007 3-year estimates, and the Economic Censuses from 1992, 2002, and 
2007.  Right-hand column shows the pooled analytical sample, which is constructed by matching workers and plants 
via industry and location, and which is used in the models. Left-hand column provides a comparison to all full time 




Table 2: Variable Construction - Principal Component Analysis Variables 
Concept of Interest O*NET Component Variables  Proportion of variance 
explained in retained 
eigenvector 
Routine Manual 
Performing General Physical Activities 86.9% 
Handling and Moving Objects (2.61) 
Controlling Machines and Processes  
Complex Analytic 
Analyzing Data or Information 70.8% 
Making Decisions and Solving Problems (2.83) 
Thinking Creatively  
Developing Objectives and Strategies  
Complex Interpersonal  
Communicating with Persons Outside Organization 
76.1% 
(2.28) 
Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal 
Relationships 
 
Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with Others  
Provide Consultation and Advice to Others  
Authors’ calculations using O*NET data. Eigenvalues in parentheses. Each factor analyzed using principal components with 
(orthogonal) varimax rotation. In each case only the first principal component is retained after rotation. Eigenvector loadings 
associated with this components are used to generate our summary measures of occupational characteristics. Analogous 
procedures using maximum likelihood and iterated principal factor approaches generated variables that are strongly correlated 




Table 3: Task Intensities of Illustrative Occupations 
























Panel A - Task-Intensity Measures and Their Component Dimensions 
Routine Manual 9.685 10.956 10.883 11.25 10.296 
Performing General Physical Activities 0.4 0.639 0.68 0.643 0.475 
Handling and Moving Objects 0.41 0.754 0.788 0.773 0.555 
Controlling Machines and Processes 0.403 0.646 0.51 0.83 0.588 
Complex Analytic 10.774 9.025 8.381 8.662 8.346 
Analyzing Data or Information 0.54 0.355 0.293 0.3 0.275 
Making Decisions and Solving Problems 0.828 0.613 0.488 0.538 0.483 
Thinking Creatively 0.635 0.44 0.268 0.315 0.298 
Developing Objectives and Strategies 0.595 0.268 0.278 0.318 0.255 
Complex Interpersonal  11.261 8.933 8.643 7.935 8.108 
Communicating with Persons Outside Organization 0.603 0.23 0.25 0.165 0.158 
Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships 0.79 0.589 0.423 0.358 0.43 
Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with Others 0.788 0.345 0.364 0.223 0.2 
Provide Consultation and Advice to Others 0.54 0.276 0.297 0.205 0.238 
Panel B - Differences in terms of Standard Deviations (Reference category is managers) 
Routine Manual 0 1.23 1.16 1.52 0.59 
Complex Analytic 0 -1.89 -2.59 -2.29 -2.63 
Complex Interpersonal  0 -2.14 -2.41 -3.06 -2.90 
Authors’ calculations using O*NET data. Task intensity measures from first principal components, transformed such that every possible value is a positive 
number. Component dimensions are scaled from 0 to 1. Example occupations provide intuitive illustrations of the task intensity measures.   
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Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Occupational Characteristic Sample   
  Mean S.D. Wage Sex Nativity 
Ethnicity-
Race Age Metro 
Percent 
Foreign 
Born  TVS K-L 
Wage 40797 39703 1 
        
Sex (proportion male) 0.72 0.45 0.185 1 
       
Nativity (proportion US-born) 0.88 0.33 0.015 0.032 1 
      
Ethnicity-Race (proportion 
white) 
0.83 0.38 0.073 0.067 0.520 1 
     
Age 41 11 0.185 0.013 0.017 0.061 1 
    
Work in a Metro Area 
(proportion) 
0.81 0.39 0.125 0.040 -0.137 -0.115 0.044 1 
   
Percent Foreign Born with < 
High school Degree (by year, 
state, industry) 
5.4 8.3 -0.021 -0.064 -0.381 -0.301 -0.008 0.138 1 
  
Total Value of Shipments 254,679 851,770 0.098 0.037 0.028 -0.006 0.036 0.068 -0.091 1 
 
Capital-Labor Ratio 107 325 0.077 0.027 0.023 0.008 0.031 0.023 -0.063 0.171 1 
Exports 30,285 196,467 0.061 0.019 0.008 -0.002 0.011 0.046 -0.050 0.529 0.098 
Computer Share of 
Investments 
0.09 0.32 0.020 -0.011 -0.017 -0.006 0.001 0.030 0.000 -0.005 -0.026 
Education Category 1.7a 1.1 0.351 0.086 0.050 0.103 -0.030 0.126 -0.093 0.072 0.061 
LWICOMP (Import 
Competition) 
0.036 0.067 0.029 -0.129 -0.134 -0.101 0.030 -0.005 0.246 -0.060 -0.045 
Complex 9.93 0.92 0.345 0.155 0.030 0.096 0.054 0.115 -0.051 0.028 0.036 
Routine 10.07 1.03 -0.282 0.136 -0.024 -0.091 -0.052 -0.127 -0.023 0.007 -0.009 
Interpersonal Interaction 9.76 1.09 0.330 0.024 0.064 0.114 0.081 0.106 -0.009 0.008 0.027 















      
Sex (proportion male) 
      
Nativity (proportion US-
born) 
      
Ethnicity-Race (proportion 
white) 
      
Age 
      
Work in a Metro Area 
(proportion) 
      
Percent Foreign Born with 
< High school Degree (by 
year, state, industry) 
      
Total Value of Shipments 
      
Capital-Labor Ratio 
      
Exports 
      
Computer Share of 
Investments 
1 
     
Education Category 0.035 1 
    
LWICOMP (Import 
Competition) 
0.043 -0.001 1 
   
Complex 0.028 0.441 -0.032 1 
  
Routine -0.043 -0.497 -0.067 -0.532 1 
 
Interpersonal Interaction 0.024 0.425 0.001 0.757 -0.709 1 
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Table 5: Routine Manual Tasks and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages: 
OLS and 2SLS Models         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








  OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Import Competition  -8860 28819 -3476 67197 
  (1,639)*** (3,119)*** (4269) (6,338)*** 
Sex, 1=Male 7716 23154 7702 23133  
(115)*** (207)*** (115)*** (207)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 2488 -2066 2490 -1956  
(181)*** (479)*** (181)*** (480)*** 
Ethnicity-Race Dummy 3275 10664 3279 10726.9 
(White & Not Hispanic=1) (158)*** (369)*** (158)*** (369.45)*** 
Age 310 901 310 901  
(4)*** (11)*** (4)*** (11)*** 
Education Categories 2914 12440 2914 12449  
(55)*** (123)*** (55)*** (123)*** 
Work in a Metro Area (1=yes) 3067 5583 3059 5507  
(94)*** (311)*** (94)*** (311)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED -98 -235 -97 -212 
  (12)*** (27)*** (12)*** (28)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 0.0027 0.0009 0.0027 0.0009  
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 4.47 0.77 4.49 0.8  
(0.42)*** (0.25)*** (0.42)*** (0.25)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002  
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Computer Share of Investments -1361 -401 -1395 -414  
(263)*** (447) (264)*** (448) 
Observations (rounded) 360000 403000 360000 403000 
R-squared 0.26 0.23 - - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (underid)   1390 1.10E+04 
Chi-sq(1) P-val   0 0 
Cragg-Donald Wald F  (weak id)   7.20E+04 1.50E+05 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F    3931 3.70E+04 
Instrument   EU Imports EU Imports 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   







Table 6: Complex Analytic Tasks and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages: 
OLS and 2SLS Models 










OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Import Competition  -12716 23095 -20429 46070 
(1,258)*** (3,065)*** (1,921)*** (6,133)*** 
Sex, 1=Male 7764 17506 7769 17451 
(86)*** (202)*** (86)*** (203)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 3151 -1536 3127 -1476 
(168)*** (427)*** (169)*** (427)*** 
Ethnicity-Race Dummy  2801 12504 2786 12533 
(137)*** (339)*** (137)*** (339)*** 
Age 270 1066 270 1066 
(4)*** (11)*** (4)*** (11)*** 
Education Categories 3181 13523 3183 13512 
(53)*** (104)*** (53)*** (104)*** 
Work in a Metro Area  2853 5826 2876 5781 
(98)*** (275)*** (99)*** (275)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED -34 -195 -36 -180 
(8)*** (24)*** (8)*** (24)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 0.0021 0.001 0.0021 0.001 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.99 
(0.30)*** (0.24)*** (0.30)*** (0.24)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 0.0009 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 
(0.0005)* (0.0004) (0.0005)* (0.0004) 
Computer Share of Investments -1178 -70 -1129 -74 
(200)*** (85) (197)*** (85) 
Observations (rounded) 408000 474000 408000 474000 
R-squared 0.2 0.2 - - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (underid)   2796 9347 
Chi-sq(1) P-val   0 0 
Cragg-Donald Wald F  (weak id)   2.10E+05 1.80E+05 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F   1.50E+04 3.50E+04 
Instrument   EU Imports EU Imports 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NB: Industry, State, and Year fixed effected included in all models; Observations rounded to protect confidentiality. 
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Table 7: Complex Interpersonal Tasks and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages: OLS and 2SLS 













OLS  OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Import Competition  9058 -6745 20726 29970 55400 
(1,521)*** (1,845)*** (4,361)*** (2,630)*** (8,444)*** 
Sex, 1=Male 8870 8883 22785 8771 22731 
(103)*** (91)*** (279)*** (103)*** (280)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 730 2620 -5162 765 -5093 
(182)*** (164)*** (678)*** (182)*** (679)*** 
Ethnicity-Race Dummy  3695 2981 14167 3710 14236 
(151)*** (133)*** (520)*** (151)*** (520)*** 
Age 296 325 1172 295 1172 
(4)*** (4)*** (15)*** (4)*** (15)*** 
Education Categories 5155 3992 14510 5125 14511 
(63)*** (53)*** (151)*** (63)*** (151)*** 
Work in a Metro Area  3041 3241 6617 2984 6569 
(101)*** (100)*** (402)*** (101)*** (402)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED -219 -123 -216 -216 -193 
(10)*** (11)*** (35)*** (10)*** (35)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 0.0028 0.0019 0.0008 0.0028 0.0008 
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 3.15 3.61 0.94 3.22 0.97 
(1.25)** (0.75)*** (0.33)*** (1.28)** (0.33)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 0.0028 0.0015 0.0008 0.0027 0.0008 
(0.0008)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0007) (0.0008)*** (0.0007) 
Computer Share of Investments -1264 -1322 -126 -1395 -130 
(286)*** (245)*** (89) (292)*** (90) 
Observations (rounded) 409000 396000 316000 409000 316000 
R-squared 0.29 0.25 0.18 - - 
F 684.9 466.07 252.8 653.03 252.81 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
K-P LM (underid)    2619 6985 
Chi-sq(1) P-val    0 0 
Cragg-Donald Wald F (weak)     2.40E+05 1.20E+05 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F    1.60E+04 2.60E+04 
Instrument       EU Imports EU Imports 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Appendix A  
 
Figure A1: Establishment size and percent of total employment in the manufacturing 
sector  
 
Source: Authors calculation from US Census Bureau’s 2007 Economic Census of the United States, 





0 20 40 60 80 100
All establishments
Estabs with 0 to 4 employees
Estabs with 5 to 9 employees
Estabs with 10 to 19 employees
Estabs with 20 to 49 employees
Estabs with 50 to 99 employees
Estabs with 100 to 249 employees
Estabs with 250 to 499 employees
Estabs with 500 to 999 employees
Estabs with 1,000 to 2,499 employees
Estabs with 2,500 employees or more
Percent of total manufacturing employees
40 
 
Table A1: Low-Wage Countries used in the Import Competition Measures 
Afghanistan Comoros Haiti Maldives Sao Tome 
Bangladesh Congo Honduras Mali Sierra Leone 
Bhutan Eqypt India Mauritania Solomon Isl. 
Benin Eq. Guinea Indonesia Mozambique Somalia 
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Kenya Myanmar Sri Lanka 
Burundi Gambia Laos Nepal Sudan 
Cambodia Ghana Lesotho Niger Tanzania 
Ctr. African Rep. Guinea Liberia Nigeria Togo 
Chad Guinea-Bissau Madagascar Pakistan Uganda 
China Guyana Malawi Rwanda Vietnam 
    Zambia 





Table A2: Routineness and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages, OLS Models All Quartiles  










Import Competition  
28818.64 695.51 -16012.11 -8859.59 
(3,119.38)*** (2440.20) (1,052.21)*** (1,639.24)*** 
Sex, 1=Male 
23154.21 15773.54 8714.12 7716.48 
(206.92)*** (144.52)*** (87.00)*** (114.55)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 
-2066.17 -566.52 2636.56 2487.88 
(478.70)*** (330.16)* (151.71)*** (181.37)*** 
Ethnicity-Race (White & Not 
Hispanic=1) 
10664.19 8506.32 3216.50 3274.87 
(369.07)*** (241.44)*** (120.53)*** (157.85)*** 
Age 
900.76 674.93 309.96 310.08 
(10.90)*** (7.15)*** (3.63)*** (3.73)*** 
Work in a Metro Area (1=yes) 
5583.12 4464.77 3240.95 3067.08 
(310.53)*** (176.44)*** (98.53)*** (93.86)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED  
-234.91 -108.23 -74.32 -98.49 
(27.37)*** (17.62)*** (7.58)*** (12.12)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 
0.0009 0.0014 0.0019 0.0027 
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 
0.77 0.97 2.91 4.47 
(0.25)*** (0.30)*** (0.63)*** (0.42)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 
-0.0002 0.0012 0.0017 0.0002 
(0.0005) (0.0005)** (0.0004)*** (0.0006) 
Computer Share of Investments 
-401.32 -230.17 -1791.78 -1360.69 
(447.05) (184.47) (259.56)*** (262.65)*** 
Education Categories 
12440.55 10332.21 3466.41 2914.36 
(122.69)*** (78.48)*** (50.56)*** (54.50)*** 
Observations (rounded to 1000s) 403000 417000 460000 360000 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.26 
F 487.64 473.68 756.53 546.99 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NB: Industry, State, and Year fixed effected included in all models; Observations rounded to protect confidentiality. 




Table A3: Routineness and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages, 2SLS Models All Quartiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







Import Competition  
67197.35 5726.83 -20913.85 -3475.70 
(6,338.14)*** (4325.10) (2,064.93)*** (4269.15) 
Sex, 1=Male 
23132.86 15766.06 8726.90 7702.23 
(207.14)*** (144.98)*** (86.95)*** (114.86)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 
-1956.20 -553.76 2625.75 2489.79 
(479.73)*** (330.86)* (151.88)*** (181.34)*** 
Ethnicity-Race  (White & Not 
Hispanic=1) 
10726.90 8515.31 3208.99 3279.31 
(369.45)*** (240.99)*** (120.58)*** (157.73)*** 
Age 
900.93 674.81 310.10 309.96 
(10.91)*** (7.15)*** (3.64)*** (3.73)*** 
Work in a Metro Area (1=yes) 
5506.98 4455.85 3254.77 3058.78 
(311.07)*** (176.33)*** (98.87)*** (93.75)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED  
-211.52 -105.90 -75.24 -97.45 
(27.50)*** (17.62)*** (7.61)*** (12.09)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 
0.0009 0.0014 0.0019 0.0027 
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 
0.80 0.97 2.90 4.49 
(0.25)*** (0.30)*** (0.63)*** (0.42)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 
-0.0002 0.0012 0.0017 0.0002 
(0.0005) (0.0005)** (0.0004)*** (0.0006) 
Computer Share of Investments 
-414.40 -232.63 -1761.20 -1394.97 
(447.93) (186.19) (259.06)*** (264.45)*** 
Education Categories 
12448.60 10330.55 3468.15 2913.86 
(122.83)*** (78.54)*** (50.59)*** (54.48)*** 
Observations (rounded to 1000s) 403000 417000 460000 360000 
R-squared - - - - 
F 487.59 473.53 722.91 518.24 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
(underidentification) 1.10E+004 5431.962 2961.645 1390.401 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0 0 0 0 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (weak 
identification) 1.50E+005 1.70E+005 1.70E+005 7.20E+004 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 3.70E+004 2.30E+004 1.20E+004 3931.098 
Instrument EU Imports EU Imports EU Imports EU Imports 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NB: Industry, State, and Year fixed effected included in all models; Observations rounded to protect confidentiality. 
These results correspond to Table 5.  
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Table A4: Complexity and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages, OLS Models All Quartiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Complexity High Complexity 
Import Competition  
-12715.78 12665.44 36730.67 23095.10 
(1,258.13)*** (1,824.91)*** (3,252.53)*** (3,064.85)*** 
Sex, 1=Male 
7763.71 10035.91 11017.04 17505.75 
(86.05)*** (94.75)*** (159.37)*** (202.19)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 
3151.31 1355.02 1627.42 -1536.08 
(168.17)*** (189.73)*** (265.22)*** (426.53)*** 
Ethnicity-Race  (White & Not 
Hispanic=1) 
2800.82 3886.84 6143.78 12503.96 
(136.89)*** (150.08)*** (193.81)*** (338.99)*** 
Age 
269.82 331.13 477.59 1066.09 
(3.56)*** (4.11)*** (5.75)*** (10.65)*** 
Work in a Metro Area (1=yes) 
2852.99 3402.39 4710.11 5826.49 
(98.45)*** (100.22)*** (139.76)*** (274.60)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED  
-34.07 -197.45 -151.79 -195.21 
(7.76)*** (12.82)*** (18.03)*** (23.99)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 
0.0021 0.0018 0.0016 0.0010 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 
0.95 3.68 1.02 0.97 
(0.30)*** (0.70)*** (0.28)*** (0.24)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 
0.0009 0.0021 -0.0002 0.0001 
(0.0005)* (0.0005)*** (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Computer Share of Investments 
-1177.54 -1662.36 -803.36 -70.09 
(199.65)*** (312.59)*** (372.10)** (84.89) 
Education Categories 
3181.03 5489.11 7501.54 13522.97 
(53.28)*** (61.12)*** (67.23)*** (103.53)*** 
Observations (rounded to 1000s) 408000 402000 355000 474000 
R-squared 0.2 0.27 0.28 0.2 
F 457.1 532.3 463.7 411.45 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NB: Industry, State, and Year fixed effected included in all models; Observations rounded to protect confidentiality. 




Table A5: Complexity and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages, 2SLS Models All Quartiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Complexity High Complexity 
Import Competition  
-20428.76 50098.47 76368.20 46070.37 
(1,920.76)*** (3,999.21)*** (6,263.46)*** (6,133.06)*** 
Sex, 1=Male 
7769.43 9949.12 11044.06 17451.04 
(86.06)*** (95.05)*** (160.34)*** (202.86)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 
3126.81 1405.39 1615.98 -1476.43 
(168.91)*** (189.96)*** (265.91)*** (427.26)*** 
Ethnicity-Race  (White & Not 
Hispanic=1) 
2785.91 3896.12 6169.76 12532.74 
(136.64)*** (150.38)*** (194.81)*** (338.88)*** 
Age 
270.00 329.86 476.57 1065.78 
(3.56)*** (4.13)*** (5.78)*** (10.65)*** 
Work in a Metro Area (1=yes) 
2875.70 3360.82 4642.97 5781.10 
(98.61)*** (100.66)*** (140.73)*** (274.72)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED  
-36.07 -184.94 -138.72 -180.26 
(7.74)*** (13.03)*** (18.31)*** (24.04)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 
0.0021 0.0018 0.0016 0.0010 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 
0.93 3.80 1.08 0.99 
(0.30)*** (0.71)*** (0.29)*** (0.24)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 
0.0009 0.0021 -0.0003 0.0001 
(0.0005)* (0.0005)*** (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Computer Share of Investments 
-1128.77 -1808.35 -940.39 -74.42 
(196.78)*** (314.54)*** (376.61)** (84.99) 
Education Categories 
3182.96 5457.41 7497.72 13511.51 
(53.35)*** (60.85)*** (67.44)*** (103.58)*** 
Observations (rounded to 1000s) 408000 402000 355000 474000 
R-squared - - - - 
F 450.1 519.94 467.65 411.72 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
(underidentification) 2795.646 4792.75 3751.609 9347.055 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0 0 0 0 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
(weak identification) 2.10E+005 1.10E+005 1.00E+005 1.80E+005 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic 1.50E+004 1.40E+004 1.00E+004 3.50E+004 
Instrument EU Imports EU Imports EU Imports EU Imports 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NB: Industry, State, and Year fixed effected included in all models; Observations rounded to protect confidentiality. 





Table A6: Interpersonal Interaction and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages, OLS Models All 
Quartiles 














Import Competition  
9057.63 -6744.67 18589.65 20726.19 
(1,520.58)*** (1,844.88)*** (1,869.80)*** (4,361.07)*** 
Sex, 1=Male 
8869.93 8882.59 14404.56 22785.20 
(102.70)*** (90.81)*** (99.31)*** (278.99)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 
729.83 2619.68 -1103.08 -5162.38 
(182.30)*** (163.74)*** (211.76)*** (677.92)*** 
Ethnicity-Race  (White & Not 
Hispanic=1) 
3694.50 2980.97 4969.62 14167.17 
(150.75)*** (133.14)*** (160.74)*** (519.82)*** 
Age 
295.71 325.09 469.44 1171.57 
(3.76)*** (3.86)*** (4.74)*** (14.81)*** 
Work in a Metro Area (1=yes) 
3040.50 3241.46 3699.37 6616.88 
(100.86)*** (100.05)*** (115.99)*** (401.57)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED  
-219.17 -123.16 -227.15 -216.14 
(9.86)*** (10.68)*** (11.92)*** (34.87)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 
0.0028 0.0019 0.0016 0.0008 
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 
3.15 3.61 0.88 0.94 
(1.25)** (0.75)*** (0.19)*** (0.33)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 
0.0028 0.0015 0.0002 0.0008 
(0.0008)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0003) (0.0007) 
Computer Share of Investments 
-1264.26 -1321.54 -1118.79 -126.20 
(286.43)*** (244.76)*** (253.91)*** (89.23) 
Education Categories 
5155.49 3991.50 7440.69 14509.85 
(63.14)*** (52.64)*** (52.09)*** (151.09)*** 
Observations (rounded to 1000s) 409000 396000 518000 316000 
R-squared 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.18 
F 684.9 466.07 789.51 252.8 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NB: Industry, State, and Year fixed effected included in all models; Observations rounded to protect confidentiality. 





Table A7: Interpersonal Interaction and LDC Import Competition - Relationship to Wages, 2SLS Models All 
Quartiles 















29970.42 -29556.98 37775.46 55400.47 
(2,630.45)*** (3,551.59)*** (3,508.38)*** (8,443.96)*** 
Sex, 1=Male 
8771.12 8882.77 14367.10 22730.88 
(102.79)*** (90.91)*** (99.69)*** (279.59)*** 
Nativity, 1=US Born 
765.47 2568.49 -1057.09 -5093.23 
(182.48)*** (164.40)*** (211.95)*** (678.78)*** 
Ethnicity-Race  (White & Not 
Hispanic=1) 
3709.54 2953.43 5004.48 14235.86 
(150.64)*** (133.40)*** (160.92)*** (519.60)*** 
Age 
294.96 325.75 468.81 1171.93 
(3.77)*** (3.86)*** (4.75)*** (14.82)*** 
Work in a Metro Area (1=yes) 
2984.29 3278.10 3663.45 6569.49 
(100.74)*** (100.58)*** (116.15)*** (401.89)*** 
% Foreign Born with <GED 
-216.25 -131.19 -217.64 -192.86 
(9.87)*** (10.81)*** (12.06)*** (34.87)*** 
Total Value of Shipments 
0.0028 0.0019 0.0016 0.0008 
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** 
Capital/Labor Ratio 
3.22 3.54 0.90 0.97 
(1.28)** (0.73)*** (0.19)*** (0.33)*** 
Value of Export Shipments 
0.0027 0.0015 0.0002 0.0008 
(0.0008)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0003) (0.0007) 
Computer Share of Investments 
-1395.32 -1230.72 -1175.09 -129.79 
(292.29)*** (245.83)*** (255.79)*** (89.53) 
Education Categories 
5125.45 3967.26 7432.46 14510.75 
(63.01)*** (52.98)*** (52.15)*** (151.13)*** 
Observations (rounded to 1000s) 409000 396000 518000 316000 
R-squared - - - - 
F 653.03 470.85 788.36 252.81 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
(underidentification) 2618.625 4237.162 6427.929 6984.596 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0 0 0 0 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
(weak identification) 2.40E+005 5.70E+004 1.90E+005 1.20E+005 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic 1.60E+004 7952.675 2.50E+004 2.60E+004 
Instrument EU Imports EU Imports EU Imports EU Imports 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NB: Industry, State, and Year fixed effected included in all models; Observations rounded to protect confidentiality. 





i Other models of task trade effects on labor markets include: an extension of the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
model that investigates the job destruction and creation effects of offshoring by relaxing full-employment conditions 
(Kohler & Wrona, 2011) and finds that jobs are destroyed as offshoring occurs, but the productivity effect can 
compensate for the job destruction effect in the long term under certain conditions; an update of the basic 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework that conceptualizes offshoring as ‘shadow migration’ of endowments, finding that 
Stolper-Samuelson predictions hold for the home country, implying that in countries like the US, inequality in the 
wages paid to skilled- and unskilled labor should rise with increased offshoring; and offshoring within a 
monopolistic competition framework (e.g., Robert-Nicoud, 2008; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2012). 
ii The model Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop is agnostic as to what actually makes a task vulnerable 
to offshoring or not (e.g., p. 13), but their discussion of tasks tends towards the routine/nonroutine division. (e.g., p. 
10-11). 
iii To construct the imports and exports, we use a crosswalk developed by Pierce and Schott (2012) to translate the 
product level information (10-digit Harmonized System (HS) codes) into the manufacturing industries that produce 
those products. The Pierce and Schott crosswalk translates HS product codes to North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) industry codes. To enable matching with the Decennial and ACS data, we further 
aggregate the NAICS industries (over 450 codes in the manufacturing sector) into Census Bureau industry codes 
(roughly 72 codes in manufacturing), which are the industry codes assigned to people with work experience in the 
demographic Censuses and Surveys collected by the US Census Bureau. CMF shipments data are similarly 
constructed and aggregated. 
iv See the World Bank’s Atlas methodology documentation for more details on how this was calculated: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD.  
v See Appendix A for the list of low-wage countries. 
vi O*NET Resource Center: http://www.onetcenter.org/; O*NET Revision 14 
vii In an interesting alternative approach, Becker et al. (2013) (and following them, Baumgarten et al. 2013) base 
their measures of the intensity of the tasks “non-routine” and “interactive” using the tools commonly deployed in 
each occupation.  
                                               
